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Abstract
In forestry work, conditions exist and develop that are complex, unpredictable, and highly consequential and therefore cannot be
handled entirely by following static work procedures. Cognitive adjustments are necessary. The objective of this research was to
determine whether performance (cognitive) variability is actually necessary to safely fell trees in the coastal region of British Columbia,
Canada. In this paper two perspectives were contrasted: the traditional view of safety and the resilience perspective. A collection of
empirical evidence established that while safe work procedures provide a good foundation, it is individual performance variability shaped
by experience and ‘‘know-how’’ that guides the application of technical skills in such a complex, dynamic, high-risk environment.
Introduction
In the profession of manual tree felling, work often takes place in remote areas with steep, rocky, and uneven terrain and
in all weather conditions. The environment is often extreme and every situation is novel. Every tree is different—its species,
health, location, and condition. Given these factors and the potential for unknown interactions, unexpected and often
escalating situations can result. In tree felling, fallers independently assess the tree and make a decision on an appropriate
course of action. Using a chainsaw, an axe, and safety gear, the tree is strategically felled in relation to the other trees with
the aim to facilitate the future collection of the logs.
Unlike most other professions, fallers deal with complex, dynamic, high-hazard conditions as a regular part of their work.
While exposure to adverse environments and this level of risk is not typical for most workers, it is considered normal in the
forestry industry. One faller explained typical conditions in his interview:
You’re blocked off by a rock bluff with nowhere to go and you’re seeing the butt-end of the tree […] under a lot of
tension and you just can’t tell how ‘‘loaded’’ it is until you start cutting it and even then, you’re not expecting it and the
cut drops and goes sailing by…it just narrowly missed me because I had just taken a half step to the left—and all the
while I’m thinking, this could go bad.
In an industry where there are no redundancies for error, this research sought to understand how manual tree fallers are able to
safely and successfully manage the work in this unforgiving environment. Two contrasting perspectives were compared to
determine how tree fallers deal with complex and varied conditions: the traditional safety perspective and the resilience perspective.
Each provides very distinct and different explanations. In the forestry industry many hold a traditional view on safety; that systems
are simple and humans are independent actors subtracting safety from the system. In this paradigm, humans are considered as a
source of risk. If something goes wrong it could well be the fault of the human. As a result, advancing safety involves protecting the
system from people who may degrade it. The practice is to introduce constraints which limit decisions and actions in order to
prevent unsafe actions and restrict individual performance variability. The most common constraint in this industry is the
application of safe work procedures (SWPs) (Dien, 1998; Lautman & Gallimore, 1987).
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However, strictly following the procedures (rules) is often
not how real work is performed. In reality, work is
accomplished by intelligently and freely applying the rules
based on context. This is in keeping with the second
perspective and theories of resilience engineering.
Researchers in this domain claim that people—with multiple
goals, limited resources, and in the context of uncertain
circumstances—have to have the ability to anticipate,
respond, and flexibly adjust to safely manage their work in
dynamic conditions. In this view, systems are considered
complex and not inherently safe (Dekker, 2006; Hollnagel,
2006) and humans are deemed to be the valuable and
positive components of the system. Research by Hollnagel
(2006) and others (Dekker, 2003; Woods, 2006) asserts that
performance variability is necessary and useful. Claiming
that progress in safety comes from enhancing people’s
adaptive capacity in the face of systemic vulnerabilities
(Woods, 2006) has gained appreciable momentum.
Due to the sheer complexity of the situations that workers
are exposed to, human cognition cannot possibly account for
all possible scenarios of what might happen. Staying safe is
primarily dependent on what cues are available, if they are
recognized, and how they are interpreted and acted upon.
Research acknowledges that people can cope with a high
degree of complexity. ‘‘People are able to make tough
decisions under difficult conditions such as limited time,
uncertainty, high stakes, vague goals, and unstable condi-
tions’’ (Orasanu & Connolly, 1993, p. 457). Successfully
operating in complex environments often requires taking
action because taking action means getting feedback and
understanding an unknown environment. A reluctance to act
could be associated with less understanding and more errors.
Action is fueled by contextual cues that people match with
pre-existing schemas to transform the complex into the
simple. However, when action is based on preconceptions
and it becomes apparent that expectations were wrong, there
may be few opportunities to correct—especially in an
industry where the consequences are often severe.
Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) observed operations within
high reliability organizations (HROs) to understand how
individuals managed the unexpected. It was found that the
workers expanded their knowledge to include imagining
what is possible. To improve foresight, HRO principles
steer people towards imaginative practices. This bolsters
anticipation and raises doubts about all expectations. This
type of strategy is encouraged because it is only a very brief
interval between surprise and success that offers opportu-
nities to discover what one does not know. People apply
resilience strategies (the ability to anticipate as well as the
process of continuous monitoring and learning) to refine
expectations. Performance variability usually increases
the effectiveness of the response but on occasion this
variability can lead to failure.
Rasmussen (1997) discusses how variability as well as
performance adjustments are shaped by the objective as well
as constraints of the work system. Workers adapt perfor-
mance to accommodate organizational pressures, limited
resources, and multiple goals in order to be successful.
During this adaptive process, workers tend to migrate toward
boundaries of efficient and functional performance. Most
systems have sufficient dampening to ensure that perfor-
mance variability does not combine or escalate in a way that
could destabilize the situation. However, once in a while
performance variability is not compatible with the conditions
and destabilization does occur (Hollnagel, 2009). If this
happens, and the boundary is crossed, it is likely that an
incident will occur. Typically, incidents are the product of
normalized performance that has been produced to counter
the effects of other system elements. The difficultly is
knowing where the boundary of safe performance is and the
degree of freedom that is available before an adverse
outcome occurs. It is evident that an approach to represent
‘‘systems behaviour is necessary which is not focused on
error and violations, but on the mechanisms generating
behaviour in the actual dynamic work context’’ (Rasmussen,
1997, p. 190). The goal should not be to dampen the
performance variability that is necessary for effective
operations, rather to manage it so it remains effective within
the boundaries of safe operations.
Method
This study used a qualitative, phenomenological research
model (Creswell, 2007) to facilitate the collection of
information. This approach was chosen because it was
considered to be an appropriate methodology to understand
and appreciate performance in context. It enabled the
identification of emergent themes and connections between
the theoretical work and the rich empirical data. To gather the
empirical evidence, interviews were conducted with 22
fallers and faller supervisors, specifically: 2 contract fallers, 4
faller supervisors, 12 company fallers, and 4 non-active
fallers. Each had a range of experience (15 to 45 years) from a
variety of coastal logging operations. Each participant was
guided through the interview using a questionnaire that
consisted of 14 open-ended questions. Questions were
designed to probe their knowledge, perspectives, and
experiences in the context of this high-risk forestry setting.
During interviews, a figure (Figure 1) was drawn and
presented by the researchers to help the participants under-
stand and articulate what repertoire of skills is necessary to
take their technical skills and apply them to context.
Results
In relation to Figure 1, fallers consistently explained that
possessing or applying technical skills does not mean that
you are competent. ‘‘You need a background to apply them
in context.’’ With a dynamic setting like the forest, several
fallers agreed, ‘‘Applying the rule will improve your odds—I
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will say they do help—but they’ll never guarantee.’’ One
supervisor stated that you really have to constantly assess
where you are working. He stated that judgment is always
needed and experience is what fills in the discretionary space
between technical skills and acceptable performance. This
demonstrates that fallers have to adopt strategies to make the
operations successful. It shows evidence of contextual or
situational variability, where situations are under-specified,
performance has to be adjusted in order to achieve the best
possible outcome (Hollnagel, 2009). In part, this is how they
are able to cope with applying static procedures to dynamic
and varied conditions.
Fallers explained that they assess cues from features of
their environment and calculate the expected interaction
of forces in motion. However, due to the sheer complex-
ity and the unforeseen nature of the environment,
conditions often violate their expectations. If this occurs,
consequences are often severe. Hence, in this work
environment there is seldom a good match between
procedures and actual conditions. While the majority of
fallers agreed on the value of knowing and applying the
fundamentals, they explained that procedures can never
fully prescribe what is out there and how best to deal with
it. In the practice of felling trees they agreed with the
research, ‘‘rules emerge from practice and experience
rather than proceeding them, procedures in other words,
end up following work instead of specifying action
beforehand’’ (Dekker, 2003, p. 234).
Every day fallers respond to unpredictable local condi-
tions, multiple hazards, and pressures and by doing so
develop a ‘‘license to think’’ (Reason, Parker, & Lawton,
1998, p. 299). This know-how provides the basis for
operation. It is a trait of an expert; a professional faller who
can make intelligent adaptations. Overall, fallers agreed
that rules are good. However, the point was also made that,
‘‘discretion is based on those rules’’ saying, ‘‘Nothing is
concrete’’ out there. There is a ‘‘sliding scale between rules
and discretion depending on context.’’ Collectively, there
was a consistent message that the basics are essential:
‘‘There are rules that get applied in every situation—about
a half a dozen…or so’’ but, after that, the knowledge and
experience that are gained from being in the forest and
listening to stories of others’ experiences are of the greatest
value.
Given the many different conditions that the fallers face,
procedures are used more as guidelines. The detriment of
‘‘forcing operational people to [rigidly] stick to the rules can
lead to ineffective, unproductive or even unsafe local
actions’’ (Dekker, 2005, p. 141). Fallers explained: ‘‘You
keep the principles in mind’’ while exercising skill and
judgment to successfully manage work in a setting where no
two situations are similar. The rules are a foundation and the
necessary degrees of freedom are related to complexity and
other system-level factors. Several mentioned that the skill of
manually felling trees requires calculating physics on the fly,
knowing the mechanics and how things are going to pivot,
shift, interact, and move. They need to be able to recognize
where hidden tensions may exist and have the skills to
understand and predict the ‘‘chain reaction’’ that can result
when a tree, that was once stable, is destabilized. One faller
described: ‘‘[I need to] recognize that it’s going to kill me,
what’s going to go where, you know your angles and your
tension and all that kind of stuff.’’ So while procedures are
useful, they are not the panacea. In order to deal with the
plethora of unknowns in this environment, fallers require
options and flexibility. Dien (1998) points outs that
procedures are but one option: individual skills and
experience, collective know-how (team coordination, coop-
eration, and communication), planning, quarter management
rules, and everyday practices are also very useful.
‘‘The [rules are] there to help you along but the knowledge
you gain is more important.’’ The complexity and
unpredictability of the environment is why fallers feel that
performance variability is necessary and that they have to
develop the skills to handle and predict the unforeseen. The
fallers were unanimous in their opinion that the interpreta-
tion of procedures is a difficulty that newcomers have to
overcome to be successful in this profession. The experi-
enced fallers support Dekker’s (2003) perspective that:
‘‘Very often working a dynamic environment happens, not in
violation of procedures but without procedures all together’’
(p. 234). ‘‘The basics are like feeder rules. And, then as your
experience goes on, you’re still working by the rules, but
you’ve seen the situation before, so you’re going to handle it
a bit differently.’’ It is the experience, knowledge, and level
of awareness that makes a difference. In context, ‘‘you’re
still using the rules but you’ve expanded them, or…they’ve
sprouted out a little bit.’’ ‘‘You might be tweaking the rule,
Figure 1. Skills, context, and situational variability ranges to enable safe
performance.
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but you’re doing it through your experience—the safest way
you think you can do that.’’
Conclusions
This research paper explored the concepts of resilience
engineering against empirical evidence to evaluate whether
performance variability is necessary to safely fell trees in
the coastal regional of British Columbia. The empirical
evidence provided data about how actual work is practiced
and how those practices were consistent with theoretical
concepts on resilience. However, the current method of
evaluating safe work in this industry is consistent with
forestry’s traditional safety perspective; one of auditing and
quantifying work performance. Audits include the direct
observation of workmanship and an examination of cuts
made in tree stumps to measure the accuracy of technical
cutting skills. Although many may find comfort in
objectively measuring performance to ensure safe practices
are being followed, the empirical evidence contrasted this
methodology by stating that, often, focusing too closely on
technical skills in the field actually reduces safety.
Concentrating on making perfect cuts limits the faller’s
opportunity to continually and critically assess the
peripheral environment which is so vital to staying safe.
The level of performance that is necessary to deliver high
levels of technical accuracy limits the variability that is
required in such a highly dynamic and complex environ-
ment. Given the characteristics of this environment,
quantifying performance by focusing on technical skills
misses the importance of the contextual features of the
surroundings. Fallers remarked that, although an asset,
absolute technical accuracy will never guarantee safety in
these types of conditions.
The complexity and dynamics of this type of environment
were the primary reason why SWPs do not fit every
situation, and in themselves cannot create safety. Fallers
explained that even after thirty years of falling there are
situations that they have never come across before so
procedures cannot possibly account for, or be detailed
enough to cover, every situation. Although traditional safety
practice relies heavily on SWPs for controlling performance,
the fallers stated that how the rules are applied, when they
should be applied, and whether they should be applied
depend very much on the circumstances at the time. They
explained that performance variability is necessary to
maintaining safety. They need the degrees of freedom and
latitude to adapt and respond as conditions dictate rather than
be restricted to following rules. They use the rules as
principles of safe practice rather than procedures that are
strictly adhered to. They explained that due to a multi-
variable environment, judgment and discretion are neces-
sary. Technical skills and procedures are the foundation of
practice but having the ability to vary performance to match
conditions is the key to staying safe.
Examining performance in this environment demon-
strates how decision making, action, goals, and available
resources are intrinsically interwoven with the features of
the environment. Decisions stem from the constant
assessment of the environment and action is formulated
based on the assessment.
Although action taken will always make sense at the
time, the cognitive limitation of being able to accurately
assess and consider all possible dynamics in such levels of
complexity could leave the system open to vulnerability.
When a faller’s assessment does not match the conditions,
their expectations are violated when the unexpected
happens and this can be seen as counterproductive to
safety. Therefore, while it was agreed that performance
variability is necessary and is the reason why things go
right most of the time, the same variability is the reason
why things sometimes go wrong. The same performance
exists behind success or failure and it is only the outcome
that determines the difference (Hollnagel, 2009).
Overall, the empirical evidence supported the resilience
philosophy; fallers are adaptable and contribute positively
to safe and productive systems. They bring a collection of
skills and strengths as well as limitations to manage
complex and dynamic work. In the context of competing
goals, and economic constraints, fallers constantly manage
the system-level tradeoffs and priorities to keep the system
within safe operating boundaries. Organizations that
embrace the resilience theories can develop ways to
support people’s skill at judging when and how to adapt.
They can enhance the attributes of performance variability
that are so essential in maintaining and managing limits of
control and keeping system performance within safe and
acceptable limits. Although resilience strategies require
constant monitoring of system performance, appreciating
and adopting this philosophy offers the potential to enhance
the system of work. Recognizing and supporting adaptive
performance in order to safely match the conditions of the
work environment has the potential to increase safe
production.
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